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During the past thirty years, clinical legal education has
become an important component of most law school curricula. In
clinics, students, typically in their second or third year of law
school, represent clients in actual cases in a legal aid office at the
law school, pursuant to a court approved "student practice order."'
Under the supervision of faculty members, students interview and
counsel clients, investigate facts, research legal rules, negotiate with
opposing parties, draft documents, and try and argue cases in
court.
Proponents of clinical education have urged the
development and expansion of clinical programs to train• students
2
in the skills necessary to apply legal doctrine in practice. While
few have argued that the traditional law school curriculum be
replaced with an entirely clinical curriculum, many have suggested
the introduction of courses using clinical methods during the first
year and increased clinical offerings in the last two years.' Just
recently, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching published a major study of legal education lauding
clinical education as one of "the law school's primary means of
teaching students how to connect the abstract thinking formed by
legal categories and procedures with fuller human contexts., 4 And
in the recent report, Best Practices for Legal Education, which
professes to present a vision and road map for legal education, the
authors argue that contextualized learning, such as clinical
training, is the most effective and efficient way for students to
develop professional competence. 5
While the proponents of clinical education identify a number
of virtues for this pedagogy,6 much of the literature on the subject
1.

See Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency Issues

in Law ClinicPractice,9 CLINIcAL L. REV. 493, 497 (2002).

2.

See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERs: PREPARATION

FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAw 115 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION

151

(2007); Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, ClinicalEducationfor
this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 41-44 (2000); Kate O'Neill,
Adding an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Perspective to a TraditionalLegal Writing

Course, 50 FLA. L. REV. 709 (1998); Franklin M. Schultz, Teaching "Lawyering" to
First-Year Law Students: An Experiment in ConstructingLegal Competence, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1643 (1995).
4. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 58.
5. STUCKE ET AL., supra note 3, at 144.
6. See generally Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 511, 512-517 (1992) [hereinafter Report on the Future of the In-House
Clinic] (identifying nine purposes of clinical legal education: (1) developing
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focuses on one major benefit: teaching modes of planning and
analysis for problem solving in unstructured situations. Advocates
of clinical education argue that traditional legal education has
focused too narrowly on legal rules and doctrinal analysis. In his
seminal article on the purposes of clinical legal education, Anthony
Amsterdam complained that traditional legal education taught
students only three kinds of analytic thinking: case reading and
interpretation; doctrinal analysis and application; and logical
conceptualization and criticism, while ignoring other modes of
analysis that are essential for the practice of law. These neglected
modes of analysis include: (1) ends-means thinking; (2) hypothesis
formulation and testing in information acquisition; and (3)
decision making in situations where options involve differing and
often uncertain degrees of risk and promises of different sorts.
Proponents of this pedagogy assert that clinical courses
address this deficiency by teaching students how to solve problems
in practice. As a committee report of the Clinical Legal Education
Section of the American Association of Law Schools asserted:
The clinic is an ideal vehicle for imparting [the skills of
ends-means thinking and applying doctrine to situations
where the facts are unclear or developing]. First, the
problems presented to students have all the difficulty,
texture, and chance that occur in the world of practice.
Students must consider this range of issues while problem
solving.
Second, the in-house clinic possesses the
resources to develop these skills. Many clinical teachers
who convey these skills begin with lecture and simulation
discussing problem-solving models. Most then follow with
intensive discussion during student supervision. While
time-consuming, that individual supervision is a powerful
modes of planning and analysis for dealing with unstructured situations; (2)
providing professional skills instruction; (3) teaching means of learning from
experience; (4) instructing students in professional responsibility; (5) exposing
students to the demands and methods of acting in role; (6) providing
opportunities for collaborative learning; (7) imparting the obligation for service to
indigent clients; (8) providing the opportunity for examining the impact of
doctrine in real life and providing a laboratory in which students and faculty study
particular areas of the law; and (9) critiquing the capacities and limitations of
lawyers and the legal system).
7. See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 95-100; Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34J. LEGAL EDuc. 612, 614-15
(1984); Report on the Future of the In-House Clinic, supranote 6, at 512.
8. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 613.
9. Id. at 614-15.
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means to focus student attention on these skills.1 °
In a similar vein, one commentator asserts that, "[w]ithout
undermining the importance of other forms of learning, clinical
education stands squarely for the proposition that students learn
most effectively by participating in their own education by actually
representing people.
Another prominent figure in the clinical
movement observes that "[s]tudents need to experience the
demands, constraints, and methods of analyzing and dealing with
unstructured situations in which the issues have not been identified
in advance.
Otherwise, their problem-solving skills cannot
mature."' 2 The Best Practicesfor Legal Education report notes that
"one of the strengths of experiential education is that it gives
students opportunities to practice solving problems and to receive
feedback on the quality of their efforts."
Indeed, the Carnegie
Report finds that "[s]tudents cannot become effective problemsolvers unless they have opportunities to engage4 in problem-solving
activities in hypothetical or real legal contexts."
Despite the extensive literature identifying these lofty goals for
clinical legal education, very little empirical work has been
conducted of the actual effects of such training on students'5
abilities to solve actual problems and learn from experience.1
Most of this scholarship is based solely on the anecdotal
experiences of !6the authors or informal surveys of students in
clinical courses.
For example, the recent Carnegie Report on
10. Report on the Future of the In-House Clinic, supra note 6, at 512.
11. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teachingfor the New ClinicalLaw
Professor: A View from the FirstFloor,28 AKRONL. REv. 463, 475 (1995).
12. Roy T. Stuckey, PreparingStudents to PracticeLaw: A Global Problem in Need of
Global Solutions, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 649, 670 (2002).
13. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 170.
14. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 95 (while purportedly quoting ROY
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP

109 (2007), such a quotation is not contained in the published copy of that
report).
15. SeeJames R.P. Ogloff et al., More Than "Learningto Think Like a Lawyer:"
The EmpiricalResearch ofLegal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 73, 184-86 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About
PracticalJudgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 247 (1998); Donald L. Alderman
et al., The Validity of Written Simulation Exercises for Assessing Clinical Skills in Legal
Education, 41 EDUC. AND PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 1115 (1981); Brook K. Baker,
Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participationin the InterpersonalEcology of
Practice,6 CLINICAL L. REv. 1 (1999); Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can
Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client
Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 405 (2002); Andrea M. Seieslstad, Community
Building as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in
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legal education makes broad claims about the benefits of clinical
and other experiential education." The report states that clinical
training is the "law school's primary means of teaching students
how to connect the abstract thinking formed by legal categories
and procedures with fuller human context;"'8 that "responsibility of
clients and accountability for one's actions are at the center of
clinical experience;"'9 and that "context-based education is the
most effective setting in which to develop professional knowledge
and skills."2 The report primarily bases these assertions, however,
on informal surveys of clinical programs at different law schools.2'
While field research is an accepted form of qualitative empirical
research, adequate methodological
controls are necessary to assure
• 22
valid and reliable findings. Without such controls, studies such as
the Carnegie Report and Best Practices report provide only limited
assistance for an assessment of whether or not clinical education
achieves its goals.
Precisely because of this deficiency in the literature on clinical
education, I have attempted to begin some empirical research on
the subject. For the past five years I have been working with Vimla
Patel and her colleagues on developing research projects on legal
education and the profession. Patel, for the past two-and-a-half
decades, has been conducting empirical research on medical
Clinical Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 445 (2002). While one empirical study
compared skills in client interviewing between students with and without clinical
experience, it did not focus on the issue of the impact of clinical education on its
principal pedagogical goal: enhancing students' abilities to solve actual problems
and learn from experience. See Donald L. Alderman et al., The Validity of Written
Simulation Exercises for Assessing Clinical Skills in Legal Education, 41 EDUC. AND
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 1115 (1981).
17. SULLIVAN ETAL., supranote 2, at 58, 121, 125.
18. Id. at 58.
19. Id. at 121.
20. Id. at 125 (affirming a conclusion made in the Best Practicesfor Legal
Education Report).
21. In its discussion of development of professional expertise, besides relying
on informal surveys, the report also bases its recommendations on theories
developed by philosopher Hubert Dreyfus and engineer Stuart Dreyfus. Id. at
116-18. Those theories, however, are hotly contested in the cognitive science
community, see Vimla L. Patel, Steering Through the Murky Waters of Scientific Conflict:
Situated and Symbolic Models of Clinical Cognition, 7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN

413 (1995), a point that is not acknowledged by the authors of the
Report.
22. See generally Richard K.Neumann,Jr. & Stefan H. Krieger, EmpiricalInquiy
Twenty-Five Years After The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 375 (2003)
(observing that for rigorous survey research, the hypothesis must be identified
precisely, and rival hypotheses must be identified and tested as well).
MEDICINE
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education focusing particularly on the issue of teaching problemsolving methods to medical students. One of her areas of study has
been the comparison of traditional medical curricula with problembased learning (PBL), which places a strong emphasis on learning
in the context of solving and understanding authentic patient
problems.23
While Patel has recognized some benefits of PBL curricula, she
has cautioned against the bandwagon acceptance of PBL in
medical education because of the lack of rigorous empirical
assessment of the approach. 24 As she has written, "[a]s is often the
case in education, with problem-based learning, innovations in
practice outstripped theoretical justifications or empirical research
demonstrating the validity of the new approach.'
For this same
reason, given the paucity of rigorous empirical research on clinical
legal education, more rigorous study of this pedagogy is necessary
to supplement the anecdotes and tributes from teachers in the
field.
To that end, I have collaborated with Patel and her colleagues
in replicating some of their studies of medical education in the
domain of legal education. I initially conducted a study on the
development of legal reasoning in law students from first year
through graduation. 26 As a follow-up to this study, in consultation
with Patel and one of her colleagues, I have conducted a study of
the effect of clinical education on legal reasoning. This article
presents the methodology and findings of this study. This article
will first describe the previous study of the development of legal
reasoning in law students throughout law school. It will then
identify the hypotheses of the present study of the effect of clinical
legal education on student reasoning and discuss the methodology
of this research. Next, it will present the findings of the study and
relate them to the conclusions of the initial research. Finally, it will
suggest areas for future research on this subject.
23. "The problems stimulate the students to acquire all pertinent knowledge,
including the basic scientific information necessary to understand the underlying
mechanisms of health and disease." Vimla L. Patel & David R. Kaufman, Medical
Education Isn't Just About Solving Problems, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 2, 2001, at
B12. For a fuller description of the differences between traditional and PBL
medical curricula, see generally Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the
Teaching of CreativeProblem Solving, 11 CLINICAL L. REV.149, 178-79 (2004).
24. Patel & Kaufman, supra note 23, at B12.
25. Id.
26. Stefan H. Krieger, The Development of Legal ReasoningSkills in Law Students:
An EmpiricalStudy, 56J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2006).
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As with the first study, a disclaimer is required at the outset.
Findings of an individual study have only limited significance,
especially given the small sample size of this one and the fact that
the subjects were from a single law school and clinical program.
The purpose of this study, however, is not to provide definitive
conclusions on the effects of clinical education, but to lay the
groundwork for future research in the area. Hopefully, others will
review the data of this study, replicate it, fine tune it, and build on
its findings. By using methodological controls which have not been
used in most previous scholarship on clinical education, this
research offers an alternative to informal surveys and anecdotes for
assessing clinical education.
I.

PRIOR STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING IN LAW STUDENTS

The purpose of our initial study was to explore the
development of legal-reasoning skills in law students throughout
their law school careers. Cognitive scientists theorize that experts
develop schemas to solve problems-"ordered patterns of mental
representations that encapsulate all our knowledge regarding
specific objects, concepts or events. "2 Developed from repeated
encounters with similar experiences, "[a] schema can be viewed as
a coded expectation about any aspect of an individual's life, which
dictates which characteristics of a given event are attended to,
which are stored for the future and which are rejected as
irrelevant. 28 In other words, they are mental blueprints we carry
around in our heads for quick assessments of what we think should
be happening in a particular situation.
In regard to the
development of expertise, researchers theorize that as a result of
greater experience in a particular domain, experts use their welldeveloped schemas to filter out reflexively irrelevant data and focus
on relevant information to come to a solution. Novices have not
yet developed such schema systems and instead solve problems by
testing multiple hypotheses before developing a solution. 29 In our
research, modeled after a Patel study of medical students, ° we
sought to examine whether law students, by the end of their
education, had begun to develop some of the reasoning strategies
27. See Mark P. Higgins & Mary P. Tully, Hospital Doctors and Their Schemas
about AppropriatePrescribing,39 MED. EDUC. 184, 185 (2005).

28.

Id.

29.
30.

Id. at 186.
Patel & Kaufman, supra note 23.
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of experts by filtering out irrelevant information and focusing on
relevant facts and rules in solving problems. The prior study of lawstudent reasoning was conducted with subjects from Hofstra
University's School of Law and focused on three groups of
students, each with ten subjects: (1) incoming law students; (2) law
students completing the first semester of their second year; and (3)
law students nearing graduation. The study was conducted using
"semi-structured" interviews of each of the subjects.

32

In each

interview, the subjects were given a consumer fraud problem
concerning the sale of a used car and were asked to recite the facts
of the case and to determine whether the simulated client had a
viable legal claim and the basis for this answer. The transcripts of
these interviews were transcribed and coded for different factors:
(1) recall of facts; (2) identification of rules and inferences; and
(3) recital of procedural rules and approaches to take in the case.31
These data were then analyzed comparing the reasoning skills of
34
the three groups.
The findings of that study raise some intriguing issues for the
present research on the effect of clinical legal education on student
reasoning. In most respects, third-year subjects in the initial study
showed only a slight change in reasoning strategy compared to
second-year subjects.3 In regard to fact recital, for example, thirdyear subjects typically showed no improvement over their secondyear counterparts in recalling the relevant propositions in the
problem. 36 And in terms of the relevancy of the propositions
actually identified, third-year subjects, on average, recalled a mean
percentage of relevant facts comparable to second-year subjects.37
These findings, the study suggested, "appear to raise some
questions about the effectiveness of the final year-and-a-half of law
school on3 students' ability to focus on the relevant facts in a legal
problem.

1

In regard to rule identification, third-year subjects, on average,
identified more rules in comparison with second-year subjects, but
performed only slightly better than second-year students in terms
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Krieger, supra note 26, at 336.
Id. at 339; see infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
Krieger, supra note 26, at 341-42.
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 342-45.
Id. at 345.
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of mean percentage of relevant rules identified.
These findings
suggest that by the end of their third year, students seem prone to
indiscriminately generate a large number of rules, many of which
are irrelevant. As the study concluded,
This finding seems to reflect what Patel and her associates
term "the intermediate effect." They have found that
intermediates on their expertise scale, when confronted
with a problem in their specialty, often engage in a wide
scope of information gathering without screening out
irrelevant information. They simply process too much
garbage.
Here, third-year students appear to be
processing too much garbage. For example, even though
the problem explicitly stated, "Your state has no statute
that applies to this type of situation," some of the Group 3
subjects appeared unable to keep themselves from
identifyin
possible statutory rules applicable to the
problem.
In the initial study, the most dramatic difference between
second- and third-year subjects is reflected in the data on drawing
of inferences.
On average, third-year students drew fewer
inferences from common experience than first- and second-year
students who identified approximately the same number of
inferences. 4 1 This decline in inference drawing may suggest that
third-year law students are better able to pay closer attention to
detail than their counterparts.42 It may also indicate, however, that
as students progress through law school, they become less inclined
to use common experience in solving legal problems. 43 Legal
education, then, might be thwarting the brainstorming process
about facts. 44
These findings as to third-year subjects contrast significantly
from those in the Patel study of final-year medical students. Unlike
third-year law students, Patel found that graduating medical
students performed better than their second-year counterparts in
45
several ways.
For example, graduating medical students were
39.

Id. at 347.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 349.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id.

44. See id. (noting the questioning regimen in law school classes and exam
experiences have ingrained in law students a notion that they should stick to the
facts in a given problem and not rely on their own experiences).
45. Vilma Patel et al., Reasoning Strategies and Use of Biomedical Knowledge by
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more proficient than second-year students in identifying patterns of
relationships in problems and developing coherent explanations
for problems by focusing on relevant facts and doctrine. 46 Our
initial study speculated that the difference between Patel's and our
findings could be explained by the fact that all medical students
have the opportunity to apply the medical knowledge learned in
earlier years to the actual treatment of patients in clinics. Many
law students do not have these opportunities, and even if they do,
41
the experiences are usually much more limited.
II.

PRESENT STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
ON LAW STUDENT REASONING

A.

Hypotheses of Study

Building upon the initial research on development of lawstudent reasoning, this study explores the effect, if any, of clinical
legal education on student reasoning strategy. While the first study
indicated that third-year law subjects performed only slightly
differently from second-year law students in regard to fact recall
and identification of legal rules, this project was designed to
explore whether or not clinical legal education had any effect on
these and other problem-solving processes.
Proponents of clinical education argue that this pedagogy
teaches students how to problem solve and deal with unstructured
situations in which the issues have not been identified in advance.49
Students who participate in a clinical program as part of their
course work for the third year of law school obviously do not have
enough repeated experiences in practice to develop well-organized
schemas and become expert problem solvers.
But if the
proponents of clinical education are correct that the pedagogy
teaches students to problem solve, third-year law students who
participate in clinics should develop rudimentary schemas for
approaching problems in practice.
They should be more
successful, for example, in recalling relevant facts in a case and

Students, 24 MED. EDUC. 129, 132-35 (1990).

46.

Id. at 132-33; Vimla Patel et al., Biomedical Knowledge in Explanations of

ClinicalProblems by Medical Students, 22 MED. EDUC. 398, 405 (1988).

47.
48.
49.

Krieger, supra note 26, at 353.
Id.
See supranote 12 and accompanying text.

2008]

CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION

filtering out irrelevant facts than those who have not enrolled in a
clinic. They should also be more proficient in identifying relevant
rules and rejecting irrelevant rules than their nonclinical
counterparts. Additionally, in regard to inferences, based on their
practical experience, students who participate in clinics should be
able to draw more inferences from facts presented than those who
do not enroll in a clinic. Especially in light of the findings in the
initial study that third-year students, on average, do not outperform
their second-year counterparts on a number of these factors, 50 this
study attempts to examine whether clinical experience has any
significant effect on the performance of final-year law students.
In this study, we also examined two issues which were not
considered in the first study: (1) the ability of the subjects to
identify client interests; and (2) their facility in developing a future
course of action in a case. 5 ' Two of the key aspects of the problemsolving process in legal practice are the identification of client goals
5i2
and the development of strategies to achieve them:
If the
advocates for clinical education are correct, students who have
participated in a clinic should have begun to develop schemas to
consider goals and strategy development in a case. Accordingly,
they should be more effective in identifying client interests and
future courses of action than those who have not had a clinical
experience.
B. Methodology of Study
The methodology used in this study was similar to the one
employed in the previous study of Hofstra law students at different
stages in law school: Like the previous study, this one sought to
examine the development of reasoning skills as students progress
in law school. In this study, at a different law school, we compared
the skills of law students at the conclusion of their second year with
graduating students. The current research also studied the effect
of clinical legal education on these skills, comparing the reasoning
of second- and third-year law students who have not participated in
a live-client clinic with those who have enrolled in such a program.

50. See generally Krieger, supra note 26.
51. See generally id.
52. STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K.
SKILLs 36-37 (3d ed. 2007).
53. See Krieger, supra, note 26, at 332.

NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING
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1. Subjects
The study was conducted with University of Chicago Law
School students in April 2006. The research focused on three
groups: (1) third-year law students with clinical experience at the
law school's Mandel Legal Aid Clinic; (2) third-year law students
without clinical experience; and (3) second-year law students
without clinical experience. The number of subjects in each group
ranged from ten to thirteen.54
We solicited volunteers for the study by electronically sending
all second- and third-year law students at the University of Chicago
Law School a letter requesting volunteers for a study of "secondyear law students who have not taken a clinic course; third-year law
students who have taken a clinic course for the entire third year
(Fall, Winter, and Spring Quarters); and third-year students who
have not taken a clinic. 5 We assured volunteers that the study was

completely anonymous and offered $25 in compensation to each
subject.

2.

Stimulus Material

The fact pattern used in this study was based on an Illinois
appellate case, Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.57 The
problem states that the subject has just interviewed a new client,
Ralph Kuzinsky, and is reviewing her notes in her office.
Mr.
54. Group I contained thirteen subjects; Group 2 contained ten subjects;
Group 3 contained eleven subjects. This variation in number of subjects was
caused by the different number of volunteers from each group for the study.
Given the nature of this study, these slight differences do not affect the validity or
reliability of the findings.
55. A copy of the solicitation memo is available at http://www.studentlegal
reasoning.info/ucsolitication.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2008). The University of
Chicago's Institutional Review Board found that this study was exempt from its
rules governing humans as research subjects because it concerned educational
testing.
56. Because we did not have a full complement of subjects for all three
groups by the dates of the interviews, my research assistants and I also personally
solicited a few volunteers in the student lounge and the library at the law school
on the days of the interviews.
57. 458 N.E.2d 611 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983). The fact pattern presented to the
students is contained in Appendix A. Some of the facts, having no bearing on the
legal theories, were modified to provide an opportunity for students to explore the
clients' interests in the case and strategic options. Fictional information was given,
for example, about the client's marital and economic status and the amount of
damages.
58. SeeAppendix "A."
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Kuzinsky purchased an "All-Risk" homeowner's insurance policy
from State Farm Insurance Co. and seeks legal advice because the
company denied a claim for water damages to his home. When
Kuzinsky first called State Farm to inquire about a policy, its agent
promised to send a brochure showing exactly what the policy
covered and recommended the "All-Risk" policy because it was the
"Cadillac of the line" and would cover everything and insure
against all risks.59
60
Mr. Kuzinsky brought a copy of the brochure to the interview.
The brochure presents information on three different homeowner
policies: Basic, Broad, and All-Risk Special. 6 ' For each policy, the
brochure contains captioned pictures describing examples of
covered losses."' For the All-Risk policy, the brochure states that
the coverage includes the protections of the other two policies
'
"plus many others not specifically excluded."63
One of those
additional coverages is "Water damage," with a picture of an open
window and rain accumulating on the floor. 64 In small print at the
bottom of one page, the brochure provides, "This brochure
contains only a general description of coverage and is not a
statement of contract. All coveraes are subject to the exclusions
and conditions in the policy itself.1,
After examining the brochure, Kuzinsky called the agent and,
believing that the All-Risk policy provided the coverage he needed,
ordered that policy. 66 Although the agent claims the company
mailed a copy of the policy to Kuzinsky, the client denies ever
receiving it. He never requested a copy of the policy and renewed
it the next year."'
Earlier that year, Kuzinsky said water leaked through the walls
of his home's basement, causing the sump pump to stop and
resulting in accumulating water and damages in the amount of

59. Id.
60. The brochure included with the fact pattern was an exhibit included in
the record in the Dobosz case, slightly revised to update information for a 2006
insurance policy.
See Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegal
reasoning.info/ucbrochure.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Appendix "A."
67. Id.
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$10,820.68 Kuzinsky filed a claim with State Farm for the damage. 69
The company denied the claim, asserting that his policy explicitly
excluded this type of water damage. The policy, which Kuzinsky
brings to the interview, excludes the following types of water
damage:
a. flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of
water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind;
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains, or
c. natural water below the surface of the ground, including
water which exerts pressure on, or seeps or leaks through a
building, 70
sidewalk, driveway, foundation, swimming pool or other
structure.
At the interview, Kuzinsky says that he believes State Farm owes
him the full amount of the claim, and he wants to know the range
of his options.7' The fact pattern concludes with a note that
preliminary research shows no statutory or regulatory provision in
72
state or federal law addressing the issues in the case.
This case was selected as a problem for several reasons. First,
the relatively simple facts of the case provided a fact pattern that
could be digested by law students in a short period of time, making
it feasible to study the participants' understanding and recall of the
facts. Second, the basic legal concepts in the case concerned issues
that most subjects had likely encountered in their law school
careers. The Dobosz court framed the issue as a common law
contract question: whether an advertising brochure constituted
part of the insurance contract and controlled over inconsistent
language in the policy itself. 3 In considering this issue, the court
examined whether the insured relied on the brochure and whether
the brochure created an ambiguity in the contract terms. 4 Relying
on basic contract construction rules, the court held that any
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

73. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 458 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Il. App. Ct.
1983). Obviously, the legal issues examined by a court or parties in a case do not
reflect the universe of possible legal theories which can be identified in regard to a
particular fact pattern. In Dobosz, for example, further fact investigation might
have produced evidence which would support a common law fraud claim. But an

appellate opinion issued after briefing by the parties provides a good starting
point for identifying the basic legal issues in the sample case used in the study.

74.

Id. at 614.
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ambiguity in an insurance policy, particularly with provisions
limiting 75the insurer's liability, should be construed in favor of the
insured. As an alternative legal theory, the court framed the issue
as one of estoppel: an insurer may be estopped from relying on an
exclusionary clause in the policy when brochures or solicitations
misrepresent coverage. 76 Both of these theories concern issues that
have been addressed in the first year of law school and are usually
revisited in upper-level courses, such as Sales, Real Estate
Transactions, and Remedies. And by excluding any statutory or
regulatory issues, no special doctrinal expertise was necessary for
analysis of the fact pattern.
Third, while the facts of the case were fairly simple, the
attached brochure created an opportunity for exploring the
subjects' skills in close reading of a document provided by a client.
Not only did the description in the brochure of the "All-Risk"
policy raise the issue of inconsistent contract terms, but the small
print in the brochure warning that all coverages "are subject to the
exclusions and conditions in the policy itself' suggests a possible
State Farm defense to Kuzinsky's reliance on the brochure. Unlike
most law school exam questions, this fact pattern required the
subjects to examine a document provided by a client and allowed
for a more realistic simulation of the skills required in practice.
Finally, the fact pattern raised other issues that an attorney
representing an actual client faces.
For example, gaps and
inconsistencies such as the mailing of the policy to Kuzinsky, his
renewal of the policy even though he had not received a copy, or
the precise basis for the damages, provided rich opportunities for
identification of areas for fact investigation. Kuzinsky's description
of his background and beliefs also raised questions to explore
about the client's interests: that he is a young electrical engineer
married to a high school teacher; that he purchased the policy
because he believed it covered everything he needed; and that he
feels that State Farm owes him the full amount of his claim.
Kuzinsky's query at the end of the interview "to know the range of
his options" also provided the subjects an invitation to brainstorm
possible courses of action in the case beyond legal research and
analysis.''
75.
76.
77.
the fact

Id.
Id. at 615.
In the prior study of development of legal reasoning skills in law students,
pattern concluded-with the questions, "Based solely on these facts, does

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

3. Interview Methods
This study was conducted using the same "semi-structured"
interview methodology used in the previous study.7" In each
interview, the subjects were asked to verbalize their thoughts as
they had them. 7 9

To encourage detailed descriptions of the

reasoning process, the subjects were asked open-ended, probing
questions throughout the interview. 0
The interviews were conducted and taped by second- and
third-year law student research assistants who were trained by a
member of Patel's team on the use of the semi-structured interview
process. In conducting the interviews, the assistants followed a
script." The script informed the participants that the project was a

short anonymous research study on the development of legal
reasoning skills in law students.
The participants were assured
that the problem was not a test of their abilities, but rather an
attempt to determine how people think about legal problems.
Further, the interviewers told the subjects that their responses
would not be graded or revealed to their professors or anyone else
but would be tape recorded to ensure accuracy. Finally, as in the
previous study, the research assistants told each subject:
When answering the question please verbalize your
thoughts as naturally as possible. Please do not explain or
rationalize your thoughts but rather communicate them
in a free flowing manner. The easiest way to do this is to
go through your normal thought process but say
everything aloud as if no one else were in the room.83
Before the participants were handed the actual fact pattern,

your client have any viable legal claim for damages? What is the basis for your
answer?" Krieger, supra note 26, at 355. Reviewing the transcripts of the subjects'

responses, we found that a number of subjects, perhaps prompted by the
questions at the end of the fact pattern, treated the fact pattern as a law school

examination. For that reason, we modified the question at the end of the fact
pattern to more realistically replicate the kind of question asked by a client at the

end of an initial interview.
78. Id. at 339-40.
79. Id.
80. For a complete description of the methodology and the research used in
the study, see id. at 339-40.
81.

website.

A copy of the script is included in the material posted on this study's

Student

Legal

Reasoning,

ucscript.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).

82.
83.

Id.
Id.

http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/
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they were given a sample LSAT problem for a test run. In
answering this problem, the subjects were encouraged to verbalize
their thoughts and discouraged from providing explanations for
their reasoning. Then the research assistants gave the fact pattern
to the subjects and told them:
You just interviewed a new client, Ralph Kuzinsky. This
memo contains your notes from that interview. You are
now reviewing your notes alone in your office. Please
review this, either aloud or to yourself, and if you are
thinking of anything as you review these material, please
verbalize any thoughts you have as you read. This should
mirror your normal thought process. It should be as
natural as possible. Remember, just as in the previous
exercise you only need to report what you are thinking
without explaining why you think it. The information on
the page is all the information available regarding this
material8 4
After the subjects indicated that they had completely reviewed
the fact pattern, the research assistants took the problem from
them and asked them to state the facts of the case. Then, the
interviewers asked them for their assessment of the case and the
basis for their assessments. Next, the subjects were asked what they
should tell the client. And finally, the research assistants asked the
subjects to identify the next steps to take in the case. After each of
these questions, the interviewers probed the subjects' responses,
asking them if they had any other responses regarding the matter.
4.

Coding the Data
S

85

After the interviews, the tapes were transcribed.
These
transcripts were then analyzed using the same "propositional
analysis" method used in the previous study. 6 This technique
involved segmenting the responses in each think-aloud interview by
propositions (either clauses or sentence fragments reflecting a
single thought). Two research assistants and I then coded each
proposition for a number of categories: (1) recital of facts, both
relevant and irrelevant, set forth in the fact pattern; (2)
84. Id.
85. Copies of the transcripts with segmented propositions are available at
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/uctranscripts.html (last visited Nov. 12,

2008).
86. For a description of the benefits of using the propositional analysis
method for examining the reasoning process, see Krieger, supranote 26, at 341.

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

identification of rules, both relevant and irrelevant, used in the
assessment of the case; (3) drawing of inferences from the facts set
forth in the problem; (4) identification of client interests; and (5)
the next steps the subjects identified should be taken in the case.
Prior to coding the transcripts for each category, we developed
protocols to attempt, as much as possible, to standardize the
process. 87 Then, two research assistants and I reviewed each
transcript, segmented into propositions, and independently coded
them. Any identifying information indicating the subjects' year in
law school or clinic participation was kept separate from the
transcripts or tapes so the coders were unable to determine the
group to which they belonged.
After all the codings were
completed, all three of us met and reconciled all discrepancies.
C. Analysis ofData
1. Recall of Facts
As in our study of development of legal skills throughout
students' law school careers, we coded the transcriptions for recital
of facts at the point in the interview when the research assistants
took the problem from the subjects and asked them to state the
facts of the case."' The purpose of this coding was to examine our
first hypothesis that third-year law students who have participated
in a clinic should be more proficient in recalling relevant facts in a
case and filtering out irrelevant facts than those who have not
enrolled in a clinic.
To code for factual relevancy, we scored each proposition set
forth in the problem for its relevancy using the following scale: (1)
most relevant to legal issues in case or client's interests; (2) relevant
to legal issues in case or client's interests; (3) limited relevancy to
legal issues in case or client's interests; and (4) little, if any,
relevancy to legal issues in case or client's interests. 89 We based our
87. The coding protocols used in this study are available at
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html (last visited Nov. 12,

2008).
88. For related discussion in the previous study, see Krieger, supranote 26, at
341-42.
89. The protocol used for fact recitation coding is posted on the study's
website available at http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2008). The scoring system we used was similar to that used in our

previous research. Krieger, supra note 26, at 342-43.
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scoring on the opinion in the Dobosz case. 9° We scored the essential
facts relevant to the two legal theories (contract construction and
estoppel) and the client's interests in the case as "1." Cumulative
evidence as to these theories and interests, as well as facts relating
to possible defenses, were scored as "2." We scored every
background fact and statements establishing evidentiary
foundation for relevant facts as "3." All other statements were
scored as "4." Of the seventy-five propositions in the problem,
fourteen were scored as having most relevance; six were scored as
relevant; thirty-six were scored as background or foundation facts;
and nineteen were scored as having little or no relevance. 9 '
The summary of the data on the subjects' recital of facts is set
forth in Tables 1 to 3.

Table 1: Mean Number of Facts Recalled
Group

Average Number of Facts
Recalled

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

13.5 (6.4)

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

18.3 (6.2)

Group 3 (2L's)

15.1 (7.5)

*Standard deviation (SD) in parentheses

90. Dobosz, 458 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
91. A chart reflecting those codings is available at http://Nww.studentlegal
reasoning.info/ucfactcoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
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Table 2: Mean Number of Relevant Facts Recalled
Group

Most
Relevant

Relevant

Limited
Relevance

Little/No
Relevance

3.2

1.9

7

1.4

2.9

2

11.1

2.3

Group 1
(3L's with
Clinic)

Group
(3L's
without
Clinic)

2

Group

3

(2L's)

3.1
_

_

_

_

1.8
_

_

_

_

_

_

7.8
_

_

_

_

_

_

2.4
_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

Table 3: Of All Propositions Recalled, Mean Percentage of
Relevant Propositions Identified
Group

Most Relevant/Relevant
Propositions

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

38.07%

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

26.78%

Group 3 (2L's)

32.53%

In regard to recall of facts, Table 1 shows that third-year
subjects who had not participated in a clinic (Group 2) identified
the highest average number of total facts (18.3), followed by
second-year subjects with no clinic experience (Group 3) (15.1),
followed by third-year subjects with Clinic (Group 1) (13.5). In
terms of relevancy of total facts actually recited, however, Table 3
shows that third-year subjects who had taken a clinic recited the
highest mean percentage of relevant facts (38.07 percent), followed
by second-year subjects with no clinical experience (32.53 percent),
followed by third-year subjects who had not participated in a clinic
(26.78 percent).
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These data suggest that while third-year students who had no
clinical experience recalled more facts on average than their
clinical counterparts, more of the facts identified by those subjects
without clinic experience were not relevant to the problem.
Consistent with the first hypothesis, students with clinical
experience seem to be more proficient than those without such
training at filtering out irrelevant facts and focusing on the facts
that were relevant. This is an especially significant finding because
the problem in this study did not directly concern any of the
subject matters handled by the Mandel Clinic. 2 Indeed, some of
the clinical programs addressed issues in very different areas from
contract law, such as police accountability and mental health.
While it seems reasonable that students with a clinical experience
in a particular area of practice would develop rudimentary schemas
for handling problems in that subject, these findings suggest that
they can use these schemas in different areas in which they have
not practiced, but in which they have domain knowledge such as
contracts law. Accordingly, perhaps clinical training encourages
students to focus on facts relevant to doctrine of which they have
knowledge.
The data do indicate, however, that subjects in all three groups
did not pay close attention to the State Farm brochure attached to
the problem. Of the four Most Relevant and Relevant facts
reflected in the brochure, subjects in all three groups only
identified one of those propositions: that one of the ten pictures
describing the coverage of the All-Risk Policy was captioned "Water
Damage." And that fact was only identified by three subjects in
Group 1, three in Group 2, and two in Group 3. With only two
exceptions, no subject in any of the three groups identified the
other three Most Relevant and Relevant propositions in the
brochure: (1) that the brochure provided that the "All-Risk Special
Policy adds coverages from the other two policies plus many others
not specifically excluded; (2) that one of the pictures showing the
92. At the time of this study the Mandel Clinic had projects in the following
areas: Appellate Advocacy, Civil Rights and Police Accountability, Criminal and
Juvenile Justice, Employment Discrimination, Entrepreneurship, Children's
Advocacy, Housing Development, and Mental Health. Five of the Group 1
subjects participated in the Civil Rights and Police Accountability Clinic, two in the
Criminal and Juvenile Justice Clinic, four in the Mental Health Clinic, one in the
Housing Development Clinic, and one in the Entrepreneurship Clinic.
93. Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/
ucfactcoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008)
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coverage of the All-Risk Policy depicted an open window through
which rain is falling and below which a puddle is formed; and (3)
the brochure contained a statement, "This brochure contains only
a general description of coverage and is not a statement of
contract. All coverages are subject to exclusions and conditions in
the policy itself."94 This third proposition is especially important in
terms of Kuzinsky's purported reliance on the brochure and State
Farm's possible defense, which in fact was raised in the actual
case.95 One of the reasons for this lack of attention to the
brochure's details could be the subjects' perceptions that they did
not have time to review the document thoroughly. It could also
mean that none of the subjects, even those on the verge of
graduation, had been trained well in the skill of close reading of
actual case documents. But, it is especially surprising that the thirdyear subjects who had participated in a clinic and who undoubtedly
had the experience of reviewing documents for preparation of
their cases apparently did not take the time to closely read the
evidence provided with the problem.
The tendency of third-year students without clinic to recite on
average more facts of a problem, a higher percentage of which are
irrelevant, appears to reflect what Patel calls the "intermediate
effect. 96 Patel has found that as novices gain more expertise, they
often engage in a wide scope of information gathering without
screening out irrelevant facts. "They simply process too much
garbage."97 Only, as they developed expertise, could they better
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant facts. The findings in
this study suggest that without the clinical experience of schema
formation, third-Z ear students are less likely on average to screen
out irrelevancies.

94. Id. One subject in Group 2 identified the picture of the window with the
puddle beneath it, and a different Group 2 subject, pointed to the language in the
brochure that it was not a statement of contract. Id.

95. Dobosz, 458 N.E.2d at 615-16.
96. Krieger, supra note 26, at 349.
97. Id.
98. Surprisingly, as Table 3 reflects, second-year subjects identified a higher
mean percentage of relevant propositions than third-year subjects with no clinical
experience. As Table 1 demonstrates, they processed less garbage, recalling fewer
facts than the Group 2 subjects, but, of the facts recalled, a higher mean
percentage of them were relevant.
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2.

Identification of Rules

We also coded the transcripts for identification of substantive
rules. A rule was defined as any legal standard that the subject took
into account in assessing the problem. Reviewing each proposition
recited by the subjects during any portion of their discussion of the
case, my research assistants and I identified every rule considered
by each of the subjects.99 After we reconciled these identifications,
we scored the rules for relevancy. A rule was scored as relevant
only if it concerned one of the theories identified by the Dobosz
court-breach of contract or estoppel-or one of the elements for
those theories.'00 The purpose of this coding was to test our second
hypothesis: subjects who had clinical experience should be more
proficient in identifying relevant rules and rejecting irrelevant rules
than their nonclinical counterparts. As with fact recital, students
who have participated in a clinic should have started to develop
schemas for handling problems in practice which help them to
focus on relevant rules and filter out irrelevant ones.

99. A chart reflecting the rules identified by each subject is available at
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucrulecoding.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2008).
We initially distinguished between three categories: (1) "theories"explicit identification of particular causes of action such as breach of contract and
estoppel; (2) "rules"-explicit identification of an element supporting a cause of
action; and (3) "evidence marshaling"-subject appears to apply a rule by using a
term such as "argue" or "claim" in discussing evidence. After coding the data, we
found it impossible to make any significant findings because of the overlap
between the three categories, so we combined codings for all of them as a single
"rules" category.
100. This definition is very narrow, and it can be argued that experienced
lawyers might be able to identify other possible causes of action for Kuzinsky from
the facts in the problem. We used the court's decision for assessing relevancy,
however, because we needed a standard for examining the proficiency of the
subjects in identifying relevant rules. It is reasonable to assume that theories and
rules identified by the parties in the case and the court deciding the case are
arguably the most relevant to the particular case. Our goal here was to examine
the subjects' ability to identify rules concerning the most relevant causes of action,
not possible rules applicable to some less relevant hypothetical claim.
Accordingly, by scoring a rule as irrelevant, we intended only to note that it was
not applicable to breach of contract and estoppel theories.
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Tables 4 to 6 summarize the data on identification of rules.
Table 4: Mean Number of Rules Identified
Group

Mean Number of Rules
Identified

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

6.77 (2.4)

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

8.80 (2.4)

Group 3 (2L's)

6.09 (2.8)

*SD in parentheses

Table 5: Mean Number of Relevant Rules Identified
Group

Mean Number of Relevant
Rules Identified

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

5.00 (2.9)

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

5.90 (2.1)

Group 3 (2L's)
*SD in parentheses

3.73 (2.4)
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Table 6: Percent Relevant Rules Identified
Group

Relevant Rules Identified

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

73.86%

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

67.05%

Group 3 (2L's)

61.19%

Table 4 shows that third-year subjects without clinical
experience identified on average the highest number of rules (8.8);
followed by third-year subjects who had participated in a clinic
(6.77); followed by second-year subjects (6.09). In regard to the
relevancy of the rules identified, Table 5 demonstrates that thirdyear subjects who had not participated in a clinic again led the
pack, identifying on average the most relevant rules (5.90);
followed by third-year subjects with clinical experience (5.00);
followed by second-year subjects with no clinical experience (3.73).
Finally, in regard to the mean percentage of rules identified that
are relevant, Table 6 shows that 73.86 percent of the rules
identified by third-year subjects with Clinic were relevant; 67.05
percent of the rules identified by third-year subjects without Clinic
were relevant; and 61.19 percent of the second-year subjects
without Clinic were relevant.
These data indicate that once law students reach third year,
regardless of whether or not they enroll in a Clinic, they are better
able to identify rules than second-year students, and the rules they
identify are, on average, more relevant. This finding is similar to
the one in our prior study of law student reasoning in which we
found that as students progress in law school, they are able to
identify more rules in relation to a legal problem.'' The data in
this study suggest, however, that third-year students without clinical
experience are more likely to explicitly recite rules-both relevant
and irrelevant-than their clinical counterparts. But, of all the
rules identified, the percentage of relevant rules for third-year
101.

Krieger, supranote 26, at 347-49.
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students who have not participated in a clinic is less than that for
students with clinical experience. Perhaps this is another example
of the "intermediate effect" for third-year students who have not
enrolled in a clinic: they are more proficient in spotting issues in a
case than their clinical counterparts but less successful in assessing
their relevancy.

2

These data call into question the second hypothesis-that
students with clinical experience should be more proficient in
identifying relevant rules and rejecting irrelevant rules than their
nonclinical counterparts. While third-year students with clinical
experience identified a higher percentage of relevant rules in
terms of all rules identified than their nonclinical counterparts,
third-year students without clinic, on average, identified a larger
number of relevant rules than those who had participated in a
clinic.
There are several possible reasons for these differences. First,
clinic students, through their casework, may spend less time
explicitly considering legal rules than those students who have not
enrolled in a clinic. They may use the rules in practice but may not
articulate them. Second, clinic students may be less concerned
with legal theories than their non-clinic counterparts. Proponents
of clinical education argue that it helps students learn to apply
legal doctrine in practice. 10 Yet, the data raise questions as to
whether clinics are in fact facilitating the application of legal
knowledge in problem solving, or instead encouraging students to
focus on other aspects of practice, such as addressing the client's
non-legal interests. Third, clinic students at client interviews may
focus more on facts than rules and defer explicit legal analysis until
after the interview. Finally, to a lesser extent than third-year
students with clinical experience, third-year students without clinic
experience may have considered the problem on a law school exam
question, in which issue spotting was the aim, rather than a client
problem to be solved. Students with a clinic experience may have
treated the problem as an actual case for which rule identification
was only one aspect. Further research would be helpful to explore
this hypothesis and to assess the effect of clinical education on rule
application.
102.

Id. at 349.

103. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 82 (suggesting that experiential
learning helps law students learn how to apply their legal knowledge in
representation of actual clients).
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Drawing ofInferences

Our third hypothesis is that students who have participated in
a clinic should be able to draw more inferences from facts
presented than those who have not enrolled in a clinic because of
their practice experience. In our previous study on law-student
reasoning, we found a substantial decline in inference drawing in
third-year subjects as compared with those in their second year.104
We conjectured that this decrease may have reflected a greater
attention to detail by the third year in law school, or an inhibition
fostered by law school classes from assuming any facts not provided
in a problem.1 0 5 For the present study, we sought to examine
whether or not practice experience in a clinic affected the
inference-drawing process.
In coding for inferences, my research assistants and I defined
an "inference" as the drawing of a conclusion from known facts
based on premises or assumed to be true. °6 If the premise was a
legal rule, we did not code the proposition as an inference but as a
rule recital. We were only looking for inferences drawn from the
subject's experiences.
For the coding process, my research
assistants and I independently examined every proposition in the
transcripts throughout the interview. We coded every instance in
which a subject did not merely recite a fact in the problem but
made an assumption about it. We then reconciled these codings. ' °7

Krieger, supranote 26, at 345-46.
Id. at 346.
See David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, FACT INVEsTIGATION: FROM
HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF 82 (West Publishing 1984).
107. A chart reflecting these codings is available at http://www.studentlegal
reasoning.info/ucinferencecoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). We also
coded for reasonableness of the inferences based on independent assessments
made by my research assistants and me. After unreasonable inferences were
removed, the numbers were too small to draw any significant conclusions.
104.
105.
106.
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Table 7 summarizes the data for inference drawing.
Table 7: Mean Number of Inferences Drawn
Group

Number of Inferences

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

2.85 (2.2)

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

3.70 (2.5)

Group 3 (2L's)
*SD in parentheses

2.82 (1.5)

As this table shows, third-year students without clinical
experience drew, on average, the most inferences (3.70), followed
by third-year clinical subjects (2.85), followed very closely by
second-year subjects (2.82).
Apparently, like the third-year students in the prior study,
students with clinical experience are more likely to stick to the
facts. 08 Contrary to the third hypothesis, students who have
participated in a clinic are less likely than their nonclinical
counterparts to draw inferences.' °9 This phenomenon could be a
sign of cautiousness by clinical students in handling actual cases.
Perhaps students with clinical experience wait until further fact
investigation to begin the inference-drawing process. But these
data could also indicate that the clinical experience may stifle the
fact brainstorming process. Indeed, in a related finding in regard
to our examination of identification of next steps to take in the
case, third-year students without clinical experience were more
interested in investigating the facts of the case than their clinical
counterparts." 0 Given the assumption of some proponents of
clinical education that clinics facilitate the development of fact
investigation skills,"' these two findings are surprising.

108. Unlike the prior study, however, there was no substantial decline in
inferences drawn between the second-year and third-year subjects. While the
second-year subjects in the present study drew inferences, on average, at the same

rate as third-year subjects with clinical experience, the combined third-year data
shows an increase in inference drawing in the third year.
109. See supra Table 7.
110. See supra Part II.C.5.
111. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supranote 7, at 614.
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4.

Identification of Client Interests

Our fourth hypothesis is that students who have enrolled in a
clinic should be more proficient in identifying client interests than
those who have not had a clinical experience. If clinical education
teaches problem-solving skills, then students in clinical programs
should have begun to develop schemas to consider client interests
when considering a new case. To probe the subjects' reasoning in
this area, my research assistants asked the subjects what they should
tell the client after the interview."'
To determine the range of codings for subjects' recitations of
clients' interests, we reviewed the Dobosz decision and identified
every client interest described by the court. 1 3 We then added the
one interest set forth in the problem that was not included in the
Court's decision ("[RK] wants to know the range of his options").
Finally, from my own experience in practice, I brainstormed
possible interests a client may have in this kind of case.1 14 Possible
interests included: damages, the full amount of the claim,
information about the range of options, litigation costs, apology,
revenge, change in State Farm advertising materials, relief for
similarly-situated State Farm customers, peace of mind and quick
resolution of claim.

112. Student
Legal
Reasoning,
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/
ucscript.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
113. Dobosz, 458 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
114. The
protocol
for
Client Interests
codings
is
available
at
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html
(last visited Nov. 12,
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Table 8 summarizes the data for identification of Client
Interests.
Table 8: Identification of Client Interests'
Group

5

Mean Number of Interests
Identified

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

1.77 (1.7)

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

1.10 (1.1)

Group 3 (2L's)
*SD in parentheses

1.64 (1.6)

These data show that third-year subjects with clinical
experience identified, on average, the highest number of different
interests (1.77), followed by second-year subjects (1.64), followed
by third-year subjects without Clinic (1.10).
The differences between the three groups are reflected in the
following representative excerpts from the transcripts.' 16 A thirdyear student with clinical experience, for example, stated:
Subject: Ok the total in damages is ten thousand dollars
um $10,820 which he wants to have repaired. Um I would
wonder I mean I haven't had a lot of practical experience
so I don't know how quickly legal fees add up but it would
seem to me that depending on how annoyed he was about
the situation he would need to do a cost-benefit analysis to
see what his priorities were. I think I would advise the
client that um I mean depending on what my analysis of
the sewers or drains um and whether or not I felt like after
some research about a sump pump it could in fact be
excluded from this policy and that we had some colorable
claim that it could be I would suggest that we write a letter
you know draft a letter and pursue options outside of trial
and see if we could get them to agree to pay for some of it
but then I would see how far he would want to go and how
much legal fees he would want to incur based on that um
115. A chart reflecting these codings is available at http://wwsv.studentlegal
reasoning.info/ucinterestscoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
116. See Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/
uctranscripts.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
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just based on the cost of litigation. I have a natural bent
towards mediation but I don't know that this seems like it
might be a good I don't know I would want to talk to the
client and see what his feelings were on this matter um if
he was mostly besides wanting his money if he was very
annoyed about the process and therefore really wanted to
punish the other side or he just didn't really mind and
just wanted some money to pay for it.
Interviewer: Anything else you want to tell the client?
Subject: To read contracts and make sure you get a copy
before he um especially before he renews them .

.

. um

what else would I want to tell my client. It doesn't seem
like it's a clear cut case so that's why I would want to talk
to him about what his priorities were cause I think that I
mean without understanding what the law is in the
jurisdiction that um he might it might be a bit of an uphill
battle so yea that's about it.
In contrast, a third-year subject without clinical experience
merely identified one interest: "Ralph just wanted to know any
claims he might have or if he can pursue this any further." And a
second-year subject stated,
I'll try to get his permission to negotiate a settlement of
some sort um and try to get a range from him as to what
would be appropriate in this case if it is the full amount
like if he would take $9,995 or something right. And then
I would discuss with him that if that doesn't work I would
discuss with him the potential for filing a claim and tell
him what my fees are whatever they might be. That is
where I would start though tell him to fix it up and um if I
think can call the insurance company and see what they
have to say about it so.
In regard to the most frequently identified interests, little
difference existed between the groups. Subjects from all groups
noted the damages State Farm owed Kuzinsky and litigation costs.
But in terms of range of options, as a group, those subjects with
117. Student Legal Reasoning,
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/
ucinterestscoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
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clinical experience identified more interests than subjects without
clinical experience: nine interests, compared with six for secondyear subjects and four for third-year subjects who had not
participated in a clinic.' 8
Third-year subjects with clinical
experience were the only ones who identified the interests of relief
for similarly-situated customers and a quick resolution of the
claim." 9 In contrast, subjects without clinic experience were the
only subjects who did not identify revenge, pride, need for changes
in State Farm's practices and policies, and assessment of what case
is worth. 12 Finally, no subject in any group identified an apology or
peace of mind as an interest.
These data appear to support the fourth hypothesis. Subjects
who participated in a clinic were more proficient, on average, than2
those without clinical experience in identifying client interests.' '
In fact, in contrast to second-year subjects, third-year subjects with
no clinical experience were less proficient in identifying client
interests.122
Comparing these findings with those on rule
identification, it appears that third-year students without clinic
experience focused more on issue spotting than problem solving. 121
Perhaps they are at a point in law school where they just wanted to
give the doctrinal answers and not consider the specific needs of
the client.
These data also suggest some surprising findings for third-year
students with clinical experience. Although clients of the Mandel
Clinic do not pay fees, these students, on average, identified
litigation costs as an interest more often than their nonclinical
counterparts.124 Perhaps, even without an actual experience with
charging fees, students who have participated in a clinic are more
sensitive to issues arising in actual practice, especially the needs of a
real client. It is puzzling, however, that no student with clinical
experience identified an apology or peace of mind as an interest.

118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.

121.

See supra Table 8.

122.

See id.

123. See supra Part II.C.2.
124. Student Legal
Reasoning,
ucp.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).

http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/
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5. Identification of Next Steps
In their interviews, subjects were asked what steps they would
take next in the case. Our hypothesis was that subjects who had
participated in a clinic would identify more of these steps because
of their experience in practice. We conjectured that through
representation of actual clients these subjects should not only be
focusing on the facts and legal rules in a case, but should be
considering alternative courses of action to address their client's
interests. We coded identification of next steps by reviewing the
entire transcript of each subject's interview and noting all
references to possible different courses of action: (1) fact
investigation; (2) legal research; (3) alternative dispute resolution;
and (4) client counseling.12 5 We also divided each of these general
areas into subcategories.
Table 9 summarizes the data for identification of next steps.
Table 9: Mean Number of Next Steps Identified
Groups

Mean Number of Next Steps
Identified

Group 1 (3L's with Clinic)

7.15 (3.6)

Group 2 (3L's without Clinic)

6.10 (2.5)

Group 3 (2L's)
*SD in parentheses

6.64 (2.6)

These data show that on average, third-year students with
clinical experience identified the highest number of next steps
(7.15), followed by second-year students (6.64), followed by thirdyear students who had not participated in a clinic (6.10).
The differences between the responses of the subjects in the

125. The protocol for coding identification of next steps is available at
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2008). Under this protocol, we provided that the same proposition in an interview
could be scored for both client counseling and client interests. If the subject

merely recited a client interest, we only scored the proposition for that category.
But, if the subject recited a possible client interest in regard to his/her further
discussions with the client, we scored for both client interests and counseling.
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three groups can be quite stark.116 A subject with clinical
experience, for example, gave this response to the question about
the next steps he/she would take:
My next step like I said would be to do some research,
some case law research. Since it doesn't seem like there's
any statutes or regs that are relevant. To see if there [are]
any similar insurance cases in our jurisdiction or general
contract cases in which, in which one of the parties
signed the contract and then later claims to not have
known the terms of the contract. And, specifically if it's
possible to look into whether State Farm has any sort of
history of issues with this or whatever this agent does.
Maybe talking to, asking Williams if I can talk to. Sorry
asking Ralph if I can talk to you know the friend that
recommended the agent to him. So basically researching
the case law and possibly doing some factual investigation.
I guess for the sake of preserving the evidence, I would
want a more formal inspection of the damage and
assessment of the damage. Maybe I'll take pictures of the
damage in the home before it gets fixed in case we do
litigate. Basically I think I need to learn more about the,
this area of the law and do that through research or
through talking to colleagues.
In sharp contrast, a third-year subject who had not participated in a
clinic answered the question,
Urn personally I would probably do a little more research
on the substantive area of the law. Uh it doesn't seem like
it is that complicated of a case as far as what the what the
law would be and what the right answer would be. Um and
so it is probably something that could easily be um the
merits could easily be determined through legal research
so I would do that and then advise the client as to what my
findings are.
Interviewer: Anything you want to add at all?

126. The transcripts for these subjects can be found on the study's website.
Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/uctranscripts.
html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
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Subject: No.
And a second-year subject gave this response about next steps:
The next step that I would first want a copy of the policy
and look at that urn... I might try to do some research to
find out how other cases had been resolved um
depending on the situation. It might be a matter of calling
the insurance company and sort of I mean just in my own
experience um from purchasing insurance that
companies routinely deny things because they don't want
to pay the money but if you fight with them a little bit
sometimes they will capitulate and actually honor their
insurance policy. So it might be a simple matter of calling
the insurance company and saying I am the attorney for
so and so why haven't you paid this claim and sort of
getting them to honor their obligation that way... After
that I mean potentially pursue a case in court if it was
worthwhile but I mean its really it's a claim of $10,000 and
it's probably a significant amount to Ralph but it is not
like worth litigating for months and month and months
and a settlement is much more likely option and a
resolution if it got to that point.
The most frequently identified next steps for third-year
subjects with clinical experience were general legal research and
research of analogous cases; for third-year subjects without clinic,
fact investigation and research of analogous cases; and for secondyear subjects, negotiation, counseling, and obtaining additional
documents.
Third-year subjects with clinical experience were the
only subjects to identify a number of next steps: mediation,
sympathizing with the client, protecting the attorney-client
privilege, and lobbying for changes in insurance regulations. 28
Their counterparts with no clinic training were the only subjects
who identified contacting attorneys who handled similar cases,
speaking with the State Farm agent's assistant, investigating the
type of neighborhood in which Kuzinsky lived, and contacting the
Better Business Bureau.
These data appear to support the hypothesis that students with
clinical experience are more proficient in considering the next

127.
128.

Id.
Id.

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

steps in a case than their nonclinical counterparts.
Clinical
education apparently trains students to consider more extensively
the actual process of developing a strategy to resolve conflict. But
surprisingly, the most frequently identified next steps of these
subjects concerned the need for legal research. Even though these
subjects identified
fewer
rules than their nonclinical
counterparts, 129 they focused on legal research as the next step to
take in the case. One possible explanation for this finding is that
these students' clinical experience has trained them not to rely on
their own knowledge of legal doctrine but to treat every case as one
that needs research. This is not, however, 3the type of strategic
reasoning used by experts in problem solving.
The data in regard to third-year subjects without clinical
experience are also surprising. Consistent with our hypothesis,
these subjects identified fewer next steps than their clinical
counterparts.131 Perhaps, as with our findings in regard to rule
identification, 132 these subjects viewed the problem as a law-school
exam question and did not consider the ramifications of their
answers for a client they encountered in actual practice. But these
were the only subjects who identified several areas for fact
investigation, including contacting the agent's assistant and the
Better Business Bureau. As with inference drawing, these subjects
appear to be more focused on fact analysis than on subjects with
clinical experience. Accordingly, it is unclear from these data the
extent to which clinical experience actually trains students to focus
on fact investigation and analysis.
D. Preliminary Conclusions on the Effect of ClinicalEducation on
Student Problem Solving
The data collected in this study indicate that at least in some
respects, the advocates of clinical education are correct in their
assertions that this pedagogy helps to train students for the
problem-solving process. Our research suggests that subjects with
clinical experience outpaced their nonclinical counterparts in
identifying client interests and the next steps to take in the case."'
It appears that a one-year clinical experience educates students to
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See supra Tables 4-6.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
See supra Table 9.
See supra Tables 4-6.
See supra text accompanying notes 115-23 and 126-31.
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consider the needs of the client and to engage in strategic decision
making. Third-year law students without a clinical experience
seemed to be focused on the traditional law school task of issue
spotting, to treat the problem as an abstract exercise, and to
overlook the actual needs of the client.
In regard to other aspects of the problem-solving process, the
findings are more mixed. As discussed previously, expert problem
solving involves the ability to filter out irrelevant information and
focus on relevant facts and rules.1 4 In regard to fact recall, it
appears that subjects with clinical experience exhibited some of
this ability. While third-year subjects with clinical experience
recalled fewer facts on average than their nonclinical counterparts,
more of the facts identified by the clinical subjects were relevant to
the problem. 135 Subjects with clinical training, however, paid as
little attention to the brochure attached to the problem as those
without clinical experience. At least from this study, it appears that
clinical experience has little effect on a student's ability to focus on
relevant facts presented in a document provided by a client.
In one other respect, the findings as to reasoning about facts
are surprising. Third-year subjects who had not participated in a
clinic appeared to focus more on the facts of the case-whether
relevant or irrelevant. They also drew more inferences from the
facts than their clinic counterparts, and, in identifying next steps to
take, some of these subjects focused on areas of fact investigation
not considered by subjects with clinical experience.1 36 These
findings could indicate that clinics train students to stick to the
facts and not to jump to conclusions. But they also could suggest
that participation in a clinic might not necessarily lead to
proficiency in brainstorming about facts as part of the problemsolving process.
In terms of rule identification, while third-year students with
clinical experience identified a higher percentage of relevant rules
in terms of all rules identified, nonclinical third-year subjects, on
average, identified a larger number of relevant rules than those
who participated in a clinic. 3 7 It is unclear, therefore, whether
clinics help students to become more proficient in the process of
filtering out irrelevant rules and focusing on relevant ones. Given
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
See supra Tables 1 & 3.
See supraTable 7 and text accompanying note 127.
See supra Tables 5 & 6.
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the finding that subjects with clinical experience on average
identified legal research as a next step to take in the case more
frequently than their non-legal counterparts, it is possible that
these subjects were using a novice approach to problem solving,
treating every problem as one requiring legal research.
Some might argue that this measure for assessing problemsolving proficiency is wrong because the purpose of clinical
education is not to train expert legal problem solvers but instead to
educate new lawyers in problem-solving techniques which may
eventually lead to expert problem solving. 138
Under this
formulation, it might in fact be beneficial to train students in a
clinic to research every legal issue which arises in a case. This
argument, however, ignores the very benefit touted for clinical
education. The value of this pedagogy, its proponents claim, is not
merely that it teaches. helpful techniques for handling problems
but that it prepares students for problem solving in practice. 139 As I
have argued elsewhere, explicit teaching of problem-solving
techniques to clinic students does not necessarily prepare students
for practice and might in the long run actually inhibit the
development of the type of schemas needed for expert problem
solving. 14 Obviously, in a one-year clinic, students are not going to
become expert problem solvers. But if one of the purposes of
clinical education is to train novice lawyers for problem solving in
practice, it only makes sense to assess the effect of this pedagogy on
students' development of actual expertise, not simply their ability
to use particular techniques in handling a client's problem.
III. CONCLUSION
Obviously this study of clinical education is only an initial
attempt to explore the issues of the effect of this pedagogy on
student problem solving in practice. But the findings of this study,
however preliminary, do suggest both benefits and limitations of
clinical education in training students for such problem solving.
These findings indicate that in some respects, students with clinical
experience are more proficient in problem solving in actual
practice. Unlike their nonclinical counterparts, they appear to be

138. See Mark N. Aaronson & Stefan H. Krieger, Teaching Problem-Solving
Lauyering: An Exchange of Ideas, 11 CLINIcAL L. REV. 485, 491 (2005).
139. SULLIVAN ETAL., supra,note 2, at 95.
140. Aaronson & Krieger, supra note 138, at 499.
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more adept at exploring client interests and identifying next steps
to take in a case. They also seem to be better able to filter out
irrelevant facts and focus on relevant propositions. Nonclinical
students, however, appear to be more proficient at drawing
inferences and in identifying areas for fact investigation. Moreover,
nonclinical students seem to a have a better ability to identify legal
rules applicable to a problem. Rather than identifying rules,
clinical students would rather research the issues.
The methodology used in this research obviously has
limitations. The sample size was small, the study only reflects
findings at one clinical program, and no attempt was made to
control for the academic ability of the subjects or the particular
pedagogies of the faculty members in the different clinical
programs.
The research, however, was conducted with a
methodology which has been used extensively in assessing medical
education. The subjects attended one of the foremost law schools
in the country with a nationally-recognized clinic, committed for
decades to the development of clinical pedagogy. Accordingly, the
differences between the abilities of the subjects or the approaches
of the particular clinical faculty members likely were minimal.
Moreover, the selection of only students who had participated in a
clinic for a full year gave us the opportunity to assess the effect on
student problem solving of an intensive clinical program, rather
than simply a one-semester course or externship.
In this context, the findings of this research, while far from
conclusive, invite additional research to replicate this study and
expand upon it. Future research on the relationship between
experiential education and problem-solving ability should consider
the effects of: (1) clinical education at another institution; (2) onesemester clinical programs; (3) simulation courses; (4) first-year
lawyering courses; (5) externship programs; (6) summer and parttime employment; (7) different clinical pedagogies;
and (8)

141. Proponents of clinical education as a method for teaching students how
to problem solve in practice acknowledge that students do not learn this skill
simply by experience in practice. See, e.g., STUCKEY, ET AL., supra note 3, at 128
(citation omitted) ("[L]earning does not result only from experience: 'Only
experience that is reflected upon seriously will yield its measure of learning ....
Our duty as educators is both to provide the experiential opportunity and ... a
framework for regularly analyzing the experience and forming new concepts.'").
While the clinical literature is replete on suggested methods for assisting students
to learn from experience, little empirical research has been conducted to assess
the most effective means for achieving that goal.

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

142

student interest in skills courses.
With hard empirical data, a
serious exploration can be made of issues raised by the studies such
as the Carnegie Report and the Best PracticesReport. Such research
is more helpful than simple reliance on survey data by enthusiasts
or anecdotes of teachers in the field.
The Carnegie Report notes in its conclusion that most medical
schools have an office of medical education and encourages law
schools to follow suit. 141 I join in this call and invite others to start
engaging in empirical research of legal education, especially
clinical education. Only in this way can we begin to determine how
best to train students to become effective problem solvers.

142. While the academic ability of the subjects in all three groups in this study
likely was approximately the same, their interest in skills courses was not. While all
but one of the subjects in Group 1 (clinical students) had also participated in at
least one other skills course, only one subject in Group 2 (nonclinical student)
had taken such a course. These courses were Trial Practice: Strategy and
Advocacy; Negotiation and Mediation; Pretrial Advocacy; and Entrepreneurship
and the Law. Eight of the Group 1 subjects enrolled in more than one skills
course. This contrast could suggest that the differences between the approaches of
both groups to problem solving may have reflected to some degree the different
learning styles or curricular interests of the subjects in each group as much as the
effect of their clinical experience. Further research comparing clinical and
nonclinical subjects with similar course preferences would be helpful.
143.

SULLI ,AN ET AL., supra note 2, at 171.
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APPENDIX "A"
[You just interviewed a new client, Ralph Kuzinsky. This
memo contains your notes from that interview. You are now
reviewing your notes alone in your office.]
CLIENT INTAKE MEMORANDUM
CLIENT: Ralph Kuzinsky
ADDRESS: 1251 Ridgewood
Andover
DATE OF INTERVIEW: April 27, 2006
LEGAL PROBLEM: State Farm Insurance Co.'s Refusal to Pay
Claim on Homeowner Policy
Ralph Kuzinsky ("RK") is a 35-year old electrical engineer who
has been employed at Midwest Utilities since 2002. He lives with
his wife Sylvia Vondrasek (a high school English teacher) at the
above address. They moved to the area for his job at Midwest
Utilities. They have no children.
RK and his wife purchased their home at the above address in
July, 2004. Before closing on the house, he contacted State Farm
Insurance Co. to purchase homeowners' insurance. He called a
State Farm agent, Glen Williams (recommended by a friend) to
inquire about obtaining homeowners' insurance. Williams told RK
that it would take a long time to explain the policy itself, but
indicated that he would send RK a brochure which would show
exactly what the policy covered. Williams recommended the "AllRisk" policy and said it was the "Cadillac of the line" and that it
would cover everything and insure against all risks.
RK showed me a copy of the attached brochure which he said
he received from Williams. RK examined the brochure and,
believing that the "All-Risk Policy" provided the coverage he
needed, he called Williams and asked him to issue an "All-Risk
Policy" for his house.
RK remembers receiving a transmittal sheet from Williams for
the insurance in the mail a few weeks later, but denies ever
receiving a copy of the policy. For that reason, he never read the
policy. RJK says he never called Williams to request a copy of the
policy because he did not think insurance companies typically sent
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policies to purchasers. He renewed the coverage in 2005.
In early March of this year, water leaked through the walls of
the basement and sump pump pit, causing the sump pump to stop
and allowing water to accumulate in the basement. The total of the
damages was $10,820. Immediately after the incident, RK called
Williams. Williams told him that he had in fact sent RK a copy of
the policy along with the transmittal letter. RK submitted a claim
for the damages caused by the leak, but State Farm sent him a
letter denying coverage asserting that the policy excluded that type
of water damage. At that point, RK called Williams for a copy of
the policy, and Williams sent a copy to him.
RK showed me the policy sent to him by Williams. It excludes
loss from "Water Damage" which is defined as
a. flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of
water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind;
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains, or
c. natural water below the surface of the ground, including
water which exerts pressure on, or seeps or leaks through a
building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, swimming pool or other
structure.
RK believes State Farm owes him the full amount of the claim.
He wants to know the range of his options.
[Preliminary research immediately after the interview shows
that there is no statutory provision in state or federal law or
Department of Insurance regulations addressing the issues in this
case.]

